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Spaniards to travel and trade in North America, but they
could not claim title by discovery, as this was appropriate
only for property with out ownershi p. Treaties thenceforth
became the instruments for legal and political inter course
between Indian societies and Europeans (Deloria and
Lytle, 1983). The importance of recognition of Indian
societies was manifest in formal alliances such as that
between the Iroqu ois Confederacy and English colonists
in their disputes with French colonists at the outset of the
French and Indian Wars in 1763 (Pevar, 1992).

INTRODUCTION
Treaty entitlements t o hunt, fish, and gather natural
resources in the Great Lakes region have become
increasingly contentious since the early nineteen
seventies, coinciding with a period of federal Indian
policy that h as been described as “Tribal Selfdetermination.” This renewal of interest by native people1
has paralleled events in the Pacific northwest where a
landmark decision by federal judge George Boldt in 1974
set the stage for a succession of cases that have revita lized
tribal fisheries all over the United States. One of the most
recent conflicts to gain public attention is the dispute
between the St ate of Minnesota and the Mille Lacs Band
of Chip pewa In dian s over exercise of treaty rights
reserved by the Indians in the Treaty of 1837. The Mille
Lacs case is particular ly interesting because it revisits a
number of issues already addressed by earlier court
decisions. It is being litigated at a time when pr ior
experience with a very similar situation in Wisconsin
provides an opp ortun ity for reasonable speculation as to
the resource management outcomes should the Minnesota
Indians have their rights (as they see them) reaffirmed at
the appellate court level.

Forma liza tion of the relati onship between the U.S.
governmen t and India ns is expressed in th e U.S.
Constitution in Articles I and II. In the Commerce
Clause, the Constitution specifies (Art. I, Sect. 8, clause
3): “ Congress shall have the Power ... to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, ... and with the Indian
Tribes.” In the Treaty Clause ( Art. II, Sect. 2, clause 2),
the President is empowered “by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to make treaties,...” This text
establishes the basis for the contention today that state
governments have no jurisdiction in Indian a ffairs unless
specifically authorized by Congress. 2
In the first few decades of ex isten ce of the n ew United
States governmen t, treaties continued as a means of
ensuring peaceful relat ionship s between Indians and nonIndians, and they became increasingly important as
instr uments of land transfer between Indians and the
United States. In a succession of cases beginning in 1823,
the Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall
began to interpret Indian nations as “domestic dependent
nations” that enjoyed a sovereignty entitling them to
govern themselves and to engage in political relations
with the federal government (Deloria and Lytle, 1983).

This paper documents the current situation in Minnesota
and Wisconsin t hrough the succession of tr eaties and
court cases. We will examine the nature of the rights
themselves and their current reduction to contemporary
practice. In the pr ocess, I hope to furth er define th e issues
and identify common m isperception s about the exercise
of treaty rights in a multicultural context.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIAN RELATIONS
The earliest E uropean set tlers in North Am erica
established their new h omes on a continent already
occupied by over 400 independent nations. Most Indian
tribes welcomed or tolerated the arrival of Europeans and
began to actively trade land and resources for European
goods. Deloria and Lytle (1983) ascribe the European
interface with Indians to the theol ogical beliefs of
Franci sco de Vitoria who concluded that Indians were
true owners of the land. Thus, it was appropriate for the

These early decisions, t he Ch erokee ca ses, may have been
“the two most influential decisions in all of Indian law”
(Ca nby, 1988). Th e first, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
established Indian tribes as political sovereigns in the
limited sense of domestic dependent nations. In
Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall’s opin ion
is the foundat ion of jurisdict ional la w that exclud es states
from power over Indian affa irs (Canby, 1988). President
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dependent nations.” Add to this the additional complexity
of Indian activities off-reser vation an d the reciprocal
problem of how non-Indian activities off-reser vation
impact In dian li fe, and the stage is set for the recent and
continuing controversies over Indian use of fish, wildlife,
and water resources.

Andrew Jackson’s refusal to enforce the Supreme Court
ruling in Worcester v. Georgia was a h arbinger of a
multitude of policy reversals and inconsistencies that
would cloud Indian relations over the following century
Indian law scholars3 recognize several critical periods in
development of federal Indian policy (Table 1). Canby
(1988) notes tha t policies toward Indian s were often
under taken to set arigh t condition s that h ad furth er
deteriora ted in In dian commun ities as a con sequen ce of
previous administrative or legal act ion. The efficacy of
this approach is evident in the frequen cy of reversals in
policies toward Ind ians. Fr om 1828-1934 there was an
initial attempt to separate Indians from white settlers first
by relocating Indians further westward, and subsequently
by sequestering In dians on specified reservations. When
these tactics failed to limit conflicts between cultures,
forcible assimilation was attempted by offering land
patents to individual Indians if they would adopt an
agrarian lifestyle (General Allotment Act of 1887). After
the required period of residency or improvement, the
individuals who had been granted title to their land were
free to sell it. This resulted in rapid diminution of
territ ories under Indian control and ownership. From the
138 million acres under tribal ownership in 1887, only 48
mill ion acres remained in 1934 when the allotment
system was abolished (Canby, 1988).

TREATY ENTITLEMENTS TO HARVESTABLE
RESOURCES

Indian entitlement to hunt and fish fr ee of state regulati on
on reservations established by treaty is rarely contested.
Even Public Law 280 which exten ded state auth ority to a
number of civil and criminal matters on Indian land
explicitly exempts these activi ties fr om state cont rol
(Clinton et al., 1991). The question that has been broadly
challen ged is that of Indian fishi ng off reservations on
land ceded by treaty to the federal government during the
last century. Jurisdictional problems in these cases range
form questions about the extin guishment of the tr eaties
themselves to interpretation of the i ntent of the treati es
and, ultimately, to definitions of when it is appropriate
and legal for states to intervene in the harvesting
activities. Even after the legal issues have (apparently)
been settled, n on-Indi an in terests regul arly question
whether or not the best interests of conservation and
regional economics have been served.

The adverse effects that the General Allotment Act had
inflicted upon Indians wer e slow to be officially
recognized, but in 1926, Secretary of the Interior Hubert
Work commissioned a revealing study on the social and
economic status of Indians (Deloria and Lytle, 1983).
Published in 1928, the Meriam Report4 disclosed a
withering array of examples an d documenta tion of policy
gone wrong. Conditions among the Indians were said to
be so deplorable that the veracity of the report itself was
questioned, precipit atin g yet another round of
investigation before substantive remedial legislation could
be enacted. Fin ally, i n 1934, th e Indi an Reor ganizat ion
Act (Wheel er-Howar d Act) t ermi nated the policy of
allotment and provided opportunities for Indian tribes to
organize themselves in to effective self-governing units
(Deloria and Lytle, 1983).

Except for limited reference to earlier cases as needed for
clarification of concepts or precedents, the following
discussion will deal with the case curr ently under
litigation in the State of Minnesota, and its predecessor,
the Voigt case in Wisconsin. These cases involve the
Treaty of 1837 in which the Ch ippewa nation of Indians
ceded to the U.S. government a tract of land extending
from north-cent ral Wisconsin on the east to central
Minnesota on the west (Fig. 1). Chippewa entitlements
remaining in the Wisconsin portion of the ceded territory
were litigated in a succession of cases (Voigt) beginning
in 1973 in U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin. Settlement for the Wisconsin judicial district
( including consideration of the entitlements pursuant to
the Treaty of 1842) was achieved with th e decision of
District Judge Barbara B. Crabb in Lac Courte Oreilles
v. State of Wisconsin (LCO VIII) in 1991 (Satz, 1991).
Interpretati on of the entitlements of the Treaty of 1837
are being litigated again in Minnesota simply because the
judicial boundaries today leave the Minn esota jurisdiction
with the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.

The Indian Reorganization Act, and after it, the two
identifiable periods in Indian policy that bring us to the
present, are continuing testimony to the fact that there
has never been closur e to the issue of how much land
remains under the control of Indians, or how much
federal assistance is implied by the trust relationship
between the U.S. gover nmen t and its “d omestic
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to be fully resolved in Minnesota, the outcome of the
Michigan and Wisconsin cases may provide indications
of what to expect in Minnesota.

Before identifying the issues, it is important to recognize
legal tradition s relating to treaties. Judicial scholars
identify four “canons of construction” or principles of
interpr etati on in regard to treaties (Satz, 1991): 1) treaties
are to be construed in favor of the Indians; 2) ambiguous
language in treaties must be resolved in favor of the
Indians; 3) treaties must be construed as the Indians
would have understood them when they were negotiated;
and, 4) treaty rights may not be extinguished by mere
implication, but rather explicit action must be taken in
“clear language” in order to abrogate them.

Existence of Indian righ ts to continue hunting and fishing
on the ceded lands have been interpreted as usufructuary
rights and upheld by the courts. Specific language in the
treaties of 1837, 1842 an d 1854 reserves those righ ts:
Treaty of 1837, ARTICLE 5: “T he pr ivileg e of
hunting, fishing, and g athering th e wild rice,
upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes incl uded
in the territory ceded, is guaranteed to the
Indi ans, duri ng th e pleasure of the President of
the United States.”

This apparently pater nalist ic inter pretati on of treaties
derives from a recognition th at the “unletter ed peoples”
negotiating these treaties were not an equal linguistic
footing with the English-speaking representatives of the
U.S. government. It is also clear that the special trust
relationship between t he U.S. government and Indians
requires the government to behave as a guardian to its
wards (Chief Justice Marshall’s language in the Cherokee
cases). The fourth canon above also relates to what has
become known as the “reserved rights doctrine.” Deloria
and Lytle (1983) encapsulate this idea by stating the
treaties reserve to the Indians all rig hts th at have n ot been
explicitly granted away. The language of the Supreme
Court in United States v. Winans is particularly
informative where it says a treaty is “not a grant of right
to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them — a
reser vation of those not granted.”5 Thus, express
provision for food-gathering rights is not necessary to
establish their existence (Clinton, et al., 1991).

Treaty of 1842, ARTICLE II: “The Indians
stipulate for the right of hunting on the ceded
ter ritor y, with the other usual privi leges of
occupancy, until required to remove by the
President of the United States,...”
Treaty of 1854, ARTICLE 11: “And such of
them as reside in the terr itory hereby ceded,
shall have the right to hunt and fish therein,
until otherwise ordered by the President.”
The qualifying language in these pa ssages suggests to a
modern reader that the President would have “unbr idled
discretion” to extinguish the usufructuary rights (Clinton,
et al., 1991).
In 1850, President Taylor, at the request of Indian affairs
officials and Alexander Ramsay, Governor of the
Minnesota Territory, issued an order revoking the
Wisconsin Indian’s usufructuary rights and removing the
Chippewa to their u nceded lands (reservation). Taylor’s
order was broadly unpopular with th e Wisconsin
legislature and citizens of the region south of Lake
Super ior (Satz, 1991). The order was indefinitely
suspended in August of 1851, “until the final
determination of the President...” (Satz, 1991). Taylor’s
successor, Millard Fillmore, upon m eetin g in Washi ngton
in June of 1852 with a delega tion of Chip pewa headed by
Chief Buffalo (then in his nineties), is though to have
permanently rescinded the r emoval order . Although no
written record has been found confirming this, an
executive order cannot exceed the scope of the authority
delegated by Congress (in the treaty) so legal scholars
have general ly concluded tha t the Removal Or der of 1850
was invalid (Clinton, et al., 1991).

One additional legal definition, the prin ciple of
usufructuary rights, is necessary as a preamble to
consid eration of the midwestern cases. Usufructuary
rights are a special category of property rights th at confer
usage privileges upon the h older of those rights. Th ese
privileges may be reserved from sale in pending transfers
of title, as is common ly done in cases of water or mineral
rights. It has often been ar gued that continuing uses of
ceded territories by Indians for hunting, fishing, and
gathering are merely usufructuary right s, not tra nsferred
with land title unless explicitly extinguished.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN THE
TREATY CONTEXT
Issues requiring resolution in the Michigan, Wisconsin,
and Minnesota cases fall i nto two broad ca tegories of
concerns, existence or continuation of rights, and
“conservation” of natural resources. While these are yet
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that the Indians would be ent itled to th e entire a nnual
harvest of consumable resources acr oss the ceded
territories.

Modern jurists are thu s faced with the problem of judging
whether or not the usufructuar y righ ts of the Chippewa
continue to exist. Can on 3 above requires an
interpr etati on of how the Indians perceived the qualifying
conditions at the time the treaties were signed. Judge
Doyle (LCO case), in interpreting the writings of both
Indian and non -Indian observers at t he signing of the
Treaty of 1842, concluded that t he Indians ha d been
assured that they would not be required to move from the
territory unless they misbehaved, i.e. “made war, or
otherwise acted vi olently against whites.” (Satz, 1991).
Absent evidence of such misbehavior on the part of the
Indians, the courts have upheld th e continui ng existen ce
of usufructuar y rights in the Wisconsin case.

In the Pacific northwest, Judge Bold8 had all ocated 50 per
cent of the allowable harvest (defined below) to Indian
interests. There, the treaties explicitly stated that the
Indians would have “Th e right of taking fish at usual and
accustomed grounds ... in common with all citizens of the
Ter ritor y, ... “ During the economics phase of the
Wisconsin trial, state attorneys petitioned the court to
make a similar allocation in Wisconsin, but Judge Crabb,
acknowledging the langua ge in the western tr eaties,9
refused to grant the State request, stating that she could
find no such language in these treaties (Treaties of 1837
and 1842). Thr ee years later, overcome by pragmatism
and a well-entrench resort industr y based upon
recreational fishing, Judge Crabb concluded: “The
standard of a modest living does not provide a practical
way to determine the plaintiff’s share of the harvest
potential of the ceded territory.” In a colossal reversal of
her earlier thinking, h er final judgment declared: “All of
the har vestable natural resou rces to which plaintiffs
retain a usufructua ry right are declar ed to be apportion ed
equally between the plaintiffs and a ll other persons, ...”
The enormity of this provision was not lost on (then)
Attorney General James E. Doyle, Jr.10 who counted
Judge Crabb’s conclusion among seven significant
victories for Wisconsin in this case. 11

The final issue in the Wisconsin case regarding exist ence
of the property rights focused upon determi nin g “how
much of the resource base” t he Chip pewa were entitl ed
to. In concluding Phase I of the trial (LCO III), Judge
Doyle ruled that the Indian s could harvest plant and
animal resources throughout the ceded territories to an
extent necessary to main tain for themselves a “modest or
moderate” standard of living. Shortly thereafter, Judge
Doyle died, leaving the Voigt case to Judge Barbara
Crabb.
Continuing in the “economics pha se” of the case,
plaintiffs6 argued before the Crabb court that a modest
standard of living might reasonably be judged coincident
with a “zero savings” level of income, a demographic
statistic available from U.S. Census Bur eau tables. For
northern Wisconsin, this would amount to an annual
household income of appr oximately $ 21,000. Th ese
ensued extensive test imony regar ding the abundance of
consumable fish, deer, waterfowl and wild rice
throughout the ceded terr itory. Retail m arket pr ices
corresponding to fish, red meat, chicken and other
consumables were then tendered for cal culation of
resource values. It was even suggested that black bear gall
bladders, worth several hundr ed dollars a piece on the
aphrodisiac market, might be included in the evaluation.
Long before the evidence had been completely reviewed,
it was clear tha t the aggregate valu e of edible resources
would not even come close to providing a modest
standard of living with the households of the nearly 7500
tribal members living on or near reservations in the ceded
territori es. This result was subsequently reflected in Judge
Crabb’s final opinion 7: Plaintiffs’ modest living needs
cannot be met from the pr esent available har vest even if
plaintiffs were physically capable of harvesting, gathering
and processing it.” If the logic of th e economic phase of
the trial were to be pursued, the obvious result would be

The outcome of the 1979 Fox decision,12 Voigt (LCO),
and other midwestern cases clearly established that
hunting, fishing and ga ther ing righ ts cont inue to exist
under Nineteenth Century treaties. The consequences are
that a real competition arises between Indians and nonIndians; for access to publicly-held resources. Just as the
1974 Boldt decision in the Pacific n orthwest affected
fishing in hundreds of streams and dozens of watersheds,
so too did the cases in Wisconsin an d Mich igan involve
hundreds of lakes and thousands of acres of public land.
The combined areas of the treaties of 1836, 1937 and
1842 (Fig. 1) included the n orth ern one-thir d of
Wisconsin and over half the land mass of Mich igan.
Resolution of the issues would requir e even further
definitions of the lands and waters remaining within the
provisions of the treaties.
The simpl est boun dary disput es were r esolved by
returning to the lan guage of the tr eaties in d efining the
“metes and bounds” of the lands ceded. But complications
arose where the cession boundar ies projected across water
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the resource if no such surplus exists. Nevertheless, there
has continually been a re-statement of suspicion in the
non-Indian communit y that “conservation ” will not be
served if Indians use efficient modes of capture in taking
the fish or wildlife. In examining the fishing contr oversy
arising from tribal interests in salmon and steelhead
fishing durin g the decade of the sixties in the Pacific
northwest, the American Friends Service Committee
(Anon. 1970, p. 191) concluded:

bodies rather than following the “n atural” shorel ine.
Since the treaties referred to landmarks for demarca tion
of boundaries it became necessary to further define the
entitlements for those cases in which the imaginary
boundary lin e crossed the open wat ers of a lake.
In deciding the boundary issue in State v. Gurnoe et al.,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court (1972) found that the right
of Indians to fish on Lake Superior h ad been guar anteed
in the treaty of 1854 (Whaley and Bresette, 1994). The
Michigan Supreme Court (1971) in People v. Jondreau,
ruled (in keeping with the second canon of constr uction
above ) that the Keweenaw Bay Indians, living on the
shore of Lake Superior, would have understood the “right
to fish” meant “ right to fish on Keweenaw Bay,” even
though the waters of Lake Superior were not explicitly
identified within the “ceded territory.” This reasoning
was extended in Lac Courte Oreilles v. State of
Wisconsin (LCO III), where the court concluded that the
Indians would have underst ood (canon 3) “that they were
guaranteed the right to make a moderate standard of
living off the land and th e waters in and abutting
(emphasis added) the ceded territory.”

“However real and seriou s the problem s of
conservation, they ar e not the basis of this
controver sy. The real issue is the attitude of the
whole society toward difference.”
Nor was the Pacific n orthwest th e only theater in which
the “conservation” question may simply have been a
facade to cover a more odious design to wrest control over
fish and wildlife from Indians. In analysis of the Fox
decision, hist orian Robert Doherty ar gues th at control of
resource management by the state may have been a more
compelling motive for the State of Michigan than the
conservation issue (Doherty, 1990, Chapter 7).
In the Wisconsin ca se, much of the public outcr y centered
on spearing spawn ing walleye in the spring. The
Chippewa proposed to use modern boats, steel-pronged
spears, headlamps and electric trolling motors to pursue
fish in shallow water after nightfall. While an outspoken
public was inclined to suggest that the Indians should use
birch-bark canoes, wooden spears and pine torches, the
courts found t hat no such constr aints were expressed or
implied in the treaties, nor have any such constraints
been characteristic of the development of non-Indian
fisheries since the signin g of the treaties. It might further
be argued that the very provision of firearms and steel
traps to the Indi ans i n consider ation of their cessions of
land to the U.S. government testifies to th e expectation
that the Indians would employ “ modern” methods of
capture in their pursuit of fish and game.

CONSERVATION ISSUES
With “ter ritori al” an d “treaty existen ce” issues at rest in
the Wisconsin ca se, th e rema ining question s revolve
around several topics in the sphere of “conservation.” As
noted earlier, federal law prohibits states from interfering
in the affairs of Indians except in the in terests of
conser vation and public safety (Clinton, et al., 1991). An
argument for state authority to control off-reser vation
Indian hunting and fishing must th erefore be justified on
these grounds.
Conser vation issue si n tr eaty cases have covered a broad
spectrum of individual topics, including methods of
capture, quanti ties of resources to be taken and the
management authority and protocols governing the
harvest. It is generally agreed that “conservation” means
utilizat ion of living resour ces in such a mann er that the
sustain ed productivity of the stock or species is not
jeopardized by the harvest. This is an embodiment of the
common notion th at fish and wildlife resources annually
produce a “surplus” of biomass that can be har vested
without endangering the reproductive potential or future
productivity of the resource. It is important to recognize
that this sense of “conservation ” has n ever been at issue
with Indi an or non-In dian in terests. Al l have agr eed that
any allocation refers to what might reasonably be taken as
a sustainable harvest, and that no one is entitled to utilize

Opposition to spear fishing also in cluded notions of a
“sense of fair chase” ( a non-Indian cultural perspective
) coupled with t wo biological r ation ales wh ich h ave
become regular features of the management mythology
perpetuat ed by our conservation agencies, specifically: 1)
that killing animals during the annu al reproductive
season is biologically unsound; an d 2) that takin g females
is biologically injurious to the stock.
Belief in these tenets is so str ongly held by the general
public that it is not necessary for agency administrators to
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be determined by the methods described in the
opinion and order of this court ...”

promulgate falsehoods in respect to the biological
requirements for conservation. Benign refusal to debunk
unfounded public misperceptions is sufficient to
perpetuate those myths. Again, in the northwest cases
(Anon. 1970):

Methods by which a “safe harvest level” would be
determined were su pplied by the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources (Hansen, et al., 19 91). Th ey provide
a mechanism to adjust the allowable harvest (by efficient
gear) down war d in accord ance with the “reliability” of
the estimates of abunda nce of th e targeted fishery
resources.

“The state, attempting to establish its own
‘unified contr ol,’ h as end eavored to regulate
Indian off-reservation fish ing. Because a net in
a river can block it-though less efficiently than
a dam for real estate development or power —
the attack has been based on conservation:
Indians endanger the ‘seed stock for the future.’
The argument ignores th e fact th at al l salmon
are ‘seed stock.” It ignores the effects of the
sportsmen’s fishing on the same rivers, with
different gear but in far greater numbers.”

The Crabb decision also required the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) to implement
a plan to control the recreational fishery to prevent
overfishing, especially for those waters declared as targets
for the Indian spear fishery. The plan involved reducing
the traditional walleye daily bag limit fr om five fish per
day to a lesser number in accordance with the propor tion
of the safe harvest level that tribal fisherman would
“declare” by March 15 each year. For example, if the
tribes declared an inten t to take 60 percent of the safe
harvest level from a particular lake, the WDNR would be
obligated to reduce the daily bag limit on th at la ke to two
fish per day (Anon. 1991, Table 11).

The first of these myths can be dispelled simply by asking
the rhetorical question: Wha t is th e repr oductive
difference to the stock if a particular female is kil led ( by
a spear) ten minutes before she would have spawned,
rath er than six months earlier (in the recreation al fishery)
? The second myth is somewhat more difficult to dismiss
as anyone can see that the number of foals in a heard of
horses is directly related to the number of mares.
Nevertheless, fisheries biologists recognize that
“recruitment overfishing” is often not a pr oblem because
“a handful of fish can produce millions of eggs which, if
they all hatched and survived, would be more than
adequate to ensure future recruitment,” (Gulland, 1983).

To see the theor etical impact of the tribal fishery in
Wisconsin, let us examine the actual determination of the
numbers of fish to be taken in the spear fishery in
accordance with t he ru ling of the Crabb court. State
guidelin es for an “acceptable “ maxi mum ex ploitation
rate have long been set a 35 per cent of the adult st ock of
walleye. The Crabb decision allocates a maximum of 50
percent of that amount to Indian interest, but the Indians
may declare an intent to harvest less than their full
entitlement. Typically, they have stated an intent to take
a reduced per centa ge of their entitlement that will allow
the WDNR to set the daily bag limit at 2-3 fish (Anon.
1995). Each spr ing, before the spawning season, the
Indians identify the waters they intend to fish so that fish
population estimates and en forcement pr eparation s can be
made. Since spear ing is r egarded as an “efficient” gear,
a further “safety factor” is appl ied to arr ive at a final
catch quota tha t can be allocated among the fishermen.
The safety fact or may dimin ish t he availabl e fish target
by as little as 35 percent if the population estimate is no
more than a year old, or, as much as 20 percent if the
estimate is old or imprecise. Each fisherman is then
issued a permit to take a per- determin ed number of fish
from the specified water body on a particula r date. Th ese
fish will be duly counted and m easured at a specified
launching/landing site by a conservation officer at the
conclusion of the fishing occasion.

The critical issue, of course, is how many fish will be
killed, from all forces of mort alit y combined in a
particular year. Thus, the efficiency of the gear is
irrelevant as long as the total catch can be controlled.
In the Wisconsin case, the popular misconception of the
“innate dangers in fishing efficient gear” (nets and
spears) prevailed in juxtaposition with the court’s
recogn ition of the n eed for biologically sound con trol of
the fishery (endnote 7 preceding):
“Regula tion of plaintiffs’ off-reservation
usufructuary rights to harvest walleye and
muskellunge .. is reserved to plaintiffs on the
condition that they enact an d keep in force a
management plan tha t provides for the
regulati on of their members in accordance with
biologically sound principles necessary for the
conser vation of the species ... “ Th e efficient
gear safe harvest level [emphasis added] shall
59

that the Chippewa are not yet taking even half of what the
court has identified as their entitlement. It remains to be
seen whether or not this will change with out further
intervention of the court.

Say that a particular lake is though t to have a recent
population estimate of one th ousand adu lt walleye.
Suppose the Indians declar e that they want to take a ll of
their entitlement. The n umbers available for the catch
quota then become: (pop.est.) (Max. exploitat ion rat e)
(Indians’ declared interest) (“h arvest safety factor” ), or
numer ically, (1000) (0.35) (1.00) (0. 35) =123 fish . Sa y,
further, that 10 fishermen express an interest in spearing
those fish, the result is that each licensee is issued a
permit to take a dozen fish. Now, suppose that the
Indians declare that they would only want to take 60
percent of their entitlement, but the population size is
known only from a two-year -old est imat e (safety factor of
30%). Our quota calculation now becomes: (1000) (0.35)
(0.60) (0.30)= 63 fish. Suppose further tha t there is a
light wind resulting in choppy surface water during the
evening specified for the fishing, and, that this cond ition
causes only 75 percent of the quota to be taken, or 47 fish.
If the population estimate were approximately correct in
the first scenario above, the actual exploitation rate would
then be a maximum of 12.3 percent. Similarly, if
conditions described in the second scenario prevailed, the
actual exploitation rate would have been 6.3 percent.

Total costs for the st ate’s treaty fishery assessment
program are expected to exceed $ 1.2 million annually
(Anon., 1991), leading the Senate Select Commit tee on
Indian Affairs to conclude that “The cost of managing the
ceded territory fishery represents only a small percentage
of the value of benefits derived from the fishery ... the
value of the ceded terr itory fisher to the state economy, in
1985 was estimated at $ 240 million ... The value .. to the
Chippewa society and culture is immeasurable.” (Anon.,
1991).
PROGNOSIS FOR THE MINNESOTA FISHERIES
IN TERRITORIES CEDED IN THE TREATY OF
1837
On January 29, 1997, federal Judge Michael Davis issued
his Memorandum Opi nion and Order 13 in the case of The
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians et al. v. State of
Minnesota, et al. His summary judgment found in favor
of the Indians in early every point contested by the
litigant s. If the Davis opinion were to be fully
implemented, the state would not have sole management
authority to regulate tribal hunting and fishing, but would
be requi red to cooperate with the Mille Lacs Band in
reaching agreement on acceptable harvest levels. There
would be no explicit allocation of 50 percent of the
harvestable surplus to either of the parties, nor would
tribal interests be prohibited from prosecuting a treaty
fishery in any
portion of those lakes that are par tially within the ceded
territory.

The overall resul t of intensi ve walleye management in
Wisconsin since the Crabb decision has been a tribal
quota rangi ng from 39- 45 thousan d walleye, with an
actual ann ual h arvest (199 1-199 5) of 25, 100 fish by
sparing and netting (Anon., 1995). Creel sur veys
estimated an angling h arvest (kil l) of 320,000 fish per
year since 1990. Angler catch (including released fish)
average of 1,200,000 from 1990-1994. Anglers still
account for over 90 percent of the catch from over 800
lakes known to be inhabited by walleye. Annual
exploitati on rate by tribal spearing in 153 la kes with good
natural reproduction has ranged from 4-20 percent,
averaging 5 percent (Anon., 1995).

State attorneys moved quickly to appeal the Davis
decision and property owners in the region around Mille
Lacs Lake pet ition ed the U.S. Eighth Ci rcuit Cour t of
Appeals to stay the Davis order unti l the appea l could be
heard. The latter motion was granted on the
understanding that the appeal would be heard early in the
summer of 1997. The appellate court agreed however to
allow a modest harvest of walleye this spring for
ceremonial pur poses.

In fisher y mana gemen t terms, the number of adult
walleye popula tion estimates h as grown from an annual
average of less than a dozen prior to 1986 to more than
40. Fall surveys to estimate abundance of juvenile fish
have grown to over 200 annually. In th e few years that
have transpired si nce th e react ivation of the tribal
fisheries, this fish ery has gone from a condition in which
exploitati on rates had occasionally exceeded 50 percent
to one which is consistently within the accepted ran ge of
management objectives. It is now better understood and
better regulated than any other fishery of its size in the
midwest. These remain s a degree of dissatisfaction with
the current situation in the minds of many treaty rights
advocates. It is cl ear fr om the numbers pr esented above

In attempting to resolve treaty hunting and fishing rights
in the midwest, we have learned much about Indian and
non-Indian cultures. We have come to understand
ourselves and our impact on fish popula tions. We kn ow
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Anonymous. 1995. Fishery Status Update in the
Wisconsin Treaty Ceded Waters. First Edition . U.S.
Dept of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
Minneapolis, Minnesota. 20 pp.

more of our own history and of the ways in which legal
precedents help to shape the future. We can now more
fully appreciate the conclusions reach ed over a quart er of
a century ago in the Pacific northwest (Anon. 1970, p.
191).

Canby, Jr., William C. 1988. American Indian Law in a
Nutshell. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. 336
pp.

“The Indians look at fishing and fishing rights
differ ently, and they fish in di fferent ways.
Difference is nearly intolera ble in a society
which expects conformity in behavior and
outlook — one which tends to equate equal
treatment with identical treatment, acceptable
behavior with conform ing behavior, integration
with assimiliation. The Indian s’ right to fish in
different ways and under different rules is felt by
many non-In dians t o be completely
inappr opriate, and th e connection of fishing
right with iden tity to be nonsense. Hostility rises
from the threat pr esented by the differen ces, not
from danger to the fish. Efforts to control Indian
fishing have been rationalized around
conservation, but they ha ve recognized n either
the pervasive importance of environmental
changes nor the questions of humanness.”

Clinton, Robert N. , N.J. Newton, and M.E. Price. 1991.
American Indian Law: Cases and Materials. Third
Edition. The Michie Company, Ch arlottesvil le,
Virginia, 1378pp.
Deloria, Jr., Vine, and C.M. Lytle. 1983. American
Indians, American Justice. University of Texas Press,
Austin, Texas. 262 pp.
Doherty, Robert. 1990. Disputed Waters; Native
Americans and the Great Lakes Fishery . University
Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 172 pp.
Gulland, John A. 1983. Fish Stock Assessment: A
Manual of Basic Methods John Wiley & Sons, New
York. 223 pp.

In accepting the Crabb decision, leaders of the six bands
of Wisconsin Chippewa explained their rationale in
foregoing their right to further appeal:14

Hansen, Michael, J. M.D. Staggs, and M.H. Hoff. 1991.
Derivation of safety factors for setting harvest quotas
on adult walleyes from past estimates of abundance.
Trans. Am. Fish. Soc. 120' 620-628.

“ ... They do this as a gesture of peace and
friendship towards the people of Wisconsin, in
a spirit they hope may some day be reciprocated
on the part of the general citizenry and officials
of this state.”

Pevar, Stephen L. 1992. The Rights of Indians and
Tribes. Second Edition. Southern Illinois University
Press, Carbondale, Illinois, 338 pp.
Satz, Ronald N. 1991. Ch ippewa Treaty Rights.
Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters,
Transactions, Vol. 79. No. 1. 251 pp.

Will similar gestures of peace and friendship towards
Indian people be r eciprocated by the people of
Minnesota? We shall see.

Whaley, Rick an d W. Bresette. 1994. Walleye Warriors.
New Society Publishers. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
272pp.

REFERENCES
Anonymous. 1970. Uncommon Controversy: Fishing
Rights of the Muckleshoot, Puyallup, and Nisqually
Indians. A Report Prepared for the American Friends
Service Commi ttee, Univer sity of Washington Press,
Seattle, Washington, 232pp.
Anonymous. 1991. Casting Light Upon the Waters: A
Joint Fishery Assessment of the Wisconsin Ceded
Territory. U.S. Dep t. of th e Interior , Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Minneapolis, Minn esota. 102 pp.
61

ENDNOTES
1. Broader issues of tribal identity ar e treated ext ensively in : Cor nell, Stephen E. 1988. Th e return of the native:
American In dian political resurgence. Oxford Universit y Press, 1988. 285 pages.
2. Note also that the r oot of thi s very issu e was cont entious when the Continental Congr ess reviewed Art icle IX of
the Articles of Confederation, concluding finally that congressional power over tribal Indians would be paramount
(Clinton, et al. 1991).
3. The periods identified in Table 1 are approximate in date and duration because some scholars have chosen to
identify a per iod by the earl iest codified admin istr ative or legislati ve action, wh ile oth ers have elect ed to devel op
historical accounts from the onset of explicit concerns, investigations or statements of intent.
4. Meriam, Lewis. 1928. The Pr oblem of Indian Admini strati on. Johns Hopkins University Press, Balti more.
5. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
6. Th e six bands of Indians i ncluded: La w Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chip pewa In dian s, Red Cliff
Band of Wisconsin, St. Cr oix Ch ippewa Indi ans of Wisconsin, Bad River Band of The La ke Superior Chip pewa
Indians, and the Law du Flambeau Ban d of Lake Superior Chippewa India ns.

7. Fin al Jud gment of Judge Barbara Crabb in Law Courte Oreil les Ban d of Lake Superior In dian s et al. V. St ate of
Wisconsin et al., March 19, 1991 (Final Judgment 74-C-313-C)

8. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (Western Dist. Washington, 1974).
9. The “Stevens Treati es” so-named after their chief negotiator, Issa In galls Stevens, first Governor a nd first
Superinten den t of Indian Affairs for Washington Ter ritor y.
10. Wisconsin Attorn ey General Doyle was the son of Judge Crabb’s pred ecessor in th is case, federal judge James
Doyle who died in 1987.
11. Statement by Attorney General James E. Doyle, Jr. to the people of Wisconsin dated May 20, 1991, 9:30 AM .
This statement of acceptance of the Crabb decision detailed the Attorney General’s reasons for not pursuing an
appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
12. Statement by Attorney General James E. Doyle, Jr. to the people of Wisconsin, dated May 20, 1991, 9:30 AM.
This statement of acceptance of the Crabb decision detailed the Attorney General’s reasons for not pursuing an
appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
13. U.S. District Court, District of Minnesota, Third Division, Court File No. 3-94-1226, January 29, 1997.
14. Letter to the People of Wisconsin, dated May 20, 1991, and signed by Gaiashkibos, Chairman Law Courte
Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chip pewas, Patr icia R. DePerr y, Chairman Red Cliff Band of Lake Superior
Chippewas, Raymond McGeshick, Chairman Sokaogon Ch ippewa Indi an Commun ity; Mole Lake Band of
Wisconsin, Eugene Taylor, Chairman St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wisconsin, Donald Moore, Chairman Bad
River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and Michael W. Allen, Chairman Lac Du Flambeau
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa In dians.
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